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Environmental issues have become one of the most salient topics on the political agenda. This is due 
to near-unanimous consensus amongst the scientific community that all types of environmental 
degradation, particularly the release of greenhouse gases (GHG) into the atmosphere leading 
to climate change, represent a threat to life on Earth. Nonetheless, until recently, progress on 
finding political solutions to environmental problems has been remarkably slow. This is often 
linked to fears that environmental regulation may hamper economic development. Europe has 
always been an exception in this regard, as from the 1960s onward, it has gradually succeeded 
in enacting some of the most comprehensive environmental legislation in the world. All the 
while, Europe has maintained steady economic development, demonstrating that the two can 
be reconciled and are in fact mutually reinforcing.[1] Since the 1990s, Europe has relied on this 
solid base to play a leading role in the emerging global climate regime. This has been critical in 
shaping the European Union’s identity and incipient foreign policy as a normative power engaged 
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Following decades of laborious negotiations, the international 
community finally reached a new accord to tackle climate 
change during the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) held 
in Paris in 2015. The so-called ‘Paris Agreement’, signed by 
195 countries, represents the most comprehensive and 
far-reaching climate accord ever achieved. Consequently, 
President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States 
from the Paris Agreement . The first part of the paper will 
focus on the historical context of Europe’s role in climate 
diplomacy up to the Paris Agreement. The second section will 
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of EU and member 
state environmental policies, demonstrating how Europe is 
committed to lead by example, inciting further international 
climate action. The last section will examine how leading by 
example will provide Europe with the authority to position 
itself at the heart of the global climate regime, building a 
network of robust partnerships with countries around the 
world to compensate for US disengagement. The COP23 
conference held in Bonn in November 2017 should provide 
Europe with the opportunity to assert its leadership role in 
the climate regime. 
 
1. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
From the Cold War to the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Until the ending of the Cold War, the United States was 
the uncontested leader of the nascent international 
environmental regime, with Europe relegated to the 
side-lines. This was due firstly to Cold War dynamics, 
whereby Washington would have never allowed 
the European Economic Community (EEC) to claim 
leadership within the Western block, even on the issue 
of environmental protection. Moreover, the EEC was 
hampered by the lack of a legal base for environmental 
policy in the founding treaties; this, along with the 
requirement for unanimity in the Council, often 
paralyzed the Community. Several important changes 
allowed for a reversal of this situation. Firstly, as the US 
shifted towards neoliberal economic policies generally 
hostile towards regulation of any sort, it gradually 
abandoned its leadership role on the environment, 
leaving a vacuum that the EU was able to fill. Secondly, 
the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) provided the EEC 
1. Between 1990 and 2014, EU 
emissions declined by 23%, while 
GDP grew by 46%. In contrast 
to heavy industry, the green 
transition of the economy has 
generated many new jobs and 
stimulated growth in a variety 
of different sectors such as 
renewable energies. 
2. Following Syria’s announcement 
of its intention to join the Paris 
Agreement, the US has become 
the only country in the world that 
will not be party to the accord. 
Even North Korea has signed the 
agreement, pledging to reduce 
GHG emissions by 37.4% from 
a 1990 baseline. See: Taylor 
A., North Korea slams Trump’s 
decision to pull out of Paris accord 
as ‘the height of egotism’, The 
Washington Post, 7 June 2017.
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with an autonomous legal base for environmental 
policy, including internal legislation and external 
relations. Likewise, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty created 
the European Union, introduced qualified majority 
voting on environmental issues, and initiated the co-
decision procedure involving both the Council and the 
European Parliament, which facilitated the ratification 
of more ambitious legislation. Thirdly, the ending of the 
Cold War galvanized world politics during the 1990s. 
The US no longer sought to overshadow the EU in 
environmental negotiations, and the UN became less 
prone to paralysis, opening the door for new global 
action in a variety of fields. Indeed, from the early 
1990s until the Obama Presidency, the EU became the 
uncontested leader of the international environmental 
regime.[3]
The EU’s most impressive achievement remains its 
critical role in the development of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which entered into force in 2005. The Protocol 
established a legally binding framework for the 
UNFCCC, involving clear differentiated targets and 
timetables for cutting GHG emissions depending on 
each country’s level of development. Nonetheless, 
the Protocol faced staunch American opposition under 
President Bush Jr., who not only refused to ratify it, but 
sought to actively undermine it. It was at this moment 
that the EU demonstrated leadership by galvanizing 
the international community to proceed without the 
US. The EU took a significant risk, as there was no 
guarantee other nations would follow its lead. In 
fact, the EU succeeded not only in turning the Kyoto 
Protocol into a functioning accord, but also in meeting 
the requirement that the total number of signatories 
must be responsible for at least 55% of global GHG 
emissions. In order to implement these international 
commitments, the EU began to expand the scope of its 
internal environmental legislation. In 1998, it launched 
an internal burden-sharing agreement colloquially 
known as the ‘EU bubble’, which required higher 
emissions cuts from developed member states, while 
providing less developed countries with more leeway. 
Moreover, in 2005, the EU developed the Emissions 
Trading System (ETS), which became its main tool 
for delivering commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, 
and represented the world’s first international carbon 
trading system. 
 
From Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement
 
During the mid-2000s, the EU began to push for a 
more comprehensive climate agreement, as it became 
clear that Kyoto targets, even if implemented by 
all parties, would be insufficient. Many developing 
countries, especially the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) had become major GHG emitters 
without committing to binding Kyoto targets, with 
China surpassing the US in 2007 as the world’s largest 
emitter. Once again, the EU provided exemplary 
leadership with a new ‘climate and energy package’ 
in 2008, setting binding targets that included a 
20% cut in GHG emissions (from a 1990 baseline), 
as well as a 20% share for renewable energies and 
energy efficiency, to be achieved by 2020. Therefore, 
marginalization of the EU during the 2009 Copenhagen 
Summit came as a surprise. Despite model pledges by 
European states, the final agreement was essentially 
a symbolic and ineffectual deal between the US and 
China supported by the other BRIC countries. Although 
the Copenhagen Agreement contained some positive 
provisions such as the official recognition of the 
2°C threshold, it failed to establish binding pledges, 
targets or timetables to effectively address climate 
change. There are many factors explaining the EU’s 
debacle at Copenhagen, including the reassertion of 
US leadership under President Obama, as well as the 
general rise to prominence of the BRIC countries. 
Despite this setback, the EU confounded expectations 
by responding vigorously to redouble its efforts 
both in terms of domestic environmental legislation 
and climate diplomacy. Europe succeeded in re-
establishing a leadership role in subsequent COPs, 
including the Durban Summit in 2011, where the EU 
played a critical role in brokering an agreement known 
as the ‘Durban Platform’. The latter set the guidelines 
that would eventually lead to the Paris Accord, a new 
comprehensive climate agreement that involved the 
US, the BRIC’s and other developing countries.
France, as the host of the COP21 in 2015, together with 
its European partners, was determined not to repeat 
the mistakes of Copenhagen. Indeed, the outcome 
3. The EU played a critical 
role during the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit with the creation of 
the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), insisting on the 
adoption of clear targets and 
timetables. Subsequently, 
Europe was also instrumental in 
negotiating the 1998 Rotterdam 
Convention on Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides, the 
2000 Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, as well as the 2001 
Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants.
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was more successful than many had anticipated, as 
the conference established a structure for global 
climate governance signed by 195 countries. Of all the 
major parties, European States were most insistent on 
establishing timely and verifiable national emissions 
pledges that would be sufficient to provide mutual 
trust in order to achieve an ambitious agreement. The 
EU played the role of a mediator and was instrumental 
in building bridges between the development needs of 
the global South and more stringent climate demands 
from the developed North. For example, the EU began 
the conference by announcing a joint strategy with 79 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and 
European delegates played a leading role in building 
a ‘coalition of high ambition’ that involved the US. 
This coalition successfully pushed for the inclusion of 
a commitment to contain global mean temperatures 
to a 1.5 °C increase over the course of the century, 
as well as the establishment of a new ‘transparency 
framework’. The latter’s purpose was to review the 
‘intended nationally determined contributions’ (INDCs) 
of all parties, with subtle variations in expected efforts 
between developed and developing countries. 2023 
was agreed to as a starting date for the first five-yearly 
‘global stockade’ to review the adequacy of national 
efforts, regularly updating and enhancing them in 
the process. Although far from perfect,[4] the Paris 
Agreement arguably represents the best opportunity to 
address climate change, and Europe can take credit for 
its instrumental role in making the COP21 a success. 
 
2. INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: 
LEADING BY EXAMPLE
 
EU climate and energy policies
 
US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement represents 
an opportunity for Europe to redouble internal efforts 
to implement current climate commitments and 
perhaps even surpass them. This is essential in order 
to send a strong signal to other countries that Europe 
is determined to assume a key role in safeguarding 
the accord. The robust condemnation that followed 
Trump’s decision may result in greater climate action, 
both within Europe and internationally. If Europe 
succeeds in setting the example, this may encourage 
other major GHG emitters such as China, India, or 
Brazil, to maintain their climate pledges. So far, the 
global response has been encouraging. Indeed, all 
other parties to the Paris Agreement have indicated 
that they remain committed to implementing their 
climate pledges, as was made clear during the G20 
Summit held in Hamburg (July 2017). Nevertheless, 
this is no reason for complacency, as the global climate 
regime remains fragile; the positive response that 
followed Trump’s withdrawal announcement will need 
to be sustained in the years to come.
The EU’s main contribution to the COP21 is known as 
the ‘2030 climate and energy framework’, announced 
by the EU Council in October 2014. Building on the 
2020 ‘climate package’[5], the framework contains 
ambitious targets to be achieved by the year 2030, 
including at least 40% cuts in GHG emissions (from 
a 1990 baseline) and at least 27% for the share of 
renewable energies and energy efficiency. The EU’s 
main tool for achieving these targets relies on reforming 
the ETS with new indicators for competitiveness, 
including price differences with major trading partners, 
as well as better coordination between member states 
on carbon pricing. Sectors covered by the ETS, mostly 
power generation, industry and some parts of the 
aviation sector, will have to cut emissions by 43% 
(from a 2005 baseline). Non-ETS sectors, such as 
agriculture, housing, transport and waste, will have to 
cut emissions by 30%, to be converted into individual 
targets by member states. Moreover, the EU has also 
put together a so-called ‘roadmap for a low carbon 
economy’, which outlines a series of general targets 
to be met by 2050. These include a minimum 80% 
cut in GHG emissions (from a 1990 baseline), with an 
intermediate target of 60% by 2040. The roadmap 
underlines that all sectors of the economy will need 
to contribute, but that variations in emission cuts can 
occur between different sectors depending on their 
technological and economic situation. These are very 
ambitious targets, and taken together, represent some 
of the most extensive pledges announced by any group 
of countries before, during or after the COP21.
Nonetheless, while impressive, EU legislation has its 
flaws, and Europe has the potential to go further on 
4. Scientists estimate that 
the INDCs of all parties taken 
together would still probably 
result in a global warming of 
2.7°C by the end of the century 
- hence the importance of the 
five-yearly ‘global stockades’ 
(scheduled to begin in 2023) to 
gradually revise IDNCs upwards 
over time. 
5. The 2020 objectives (a 20% 
cut) were surpassed by the end 
of 2014, when EU achieved a 
23% cut. The latest projections 
indicate that the EU is heading 
for a decrease between 24 to 
25% by 2020. See: European 
Commission - Press release, 
EU shows leadership ahead of 
Paris with 23% emissions cut. 
October 2015. 
6. Carbon neutrality can be 
defined as: “having or resulting 
in no net addition of carbon 
dioxide to the atmosphere … 
counterbalancing the emission 
of carbon dioxide with carbon 
offsets”. See: Merriam-Webster 
online dictionary, ‘carbon–
neutral’.
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climate action. For example, the 2050 low-carbon 
economy roadmap does not contain a commitment for 
reaching carbon neutrality.[6] This is problematic, since 
many scientists agree that in order for global warming 
to remain below the 2°C threshold, all developed 
countries will need to reach carbon neutrality by mid-
century (and developing countries by the end of the 
century). Likewise, the 2050 roadmap does not contain 
sufficiently precise indication of how the outlined 
targets are to be achieved over the long run; it also 
lacks targets for increasing renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. Thus, the EU needs to integrate the 
objective of carbon neutrality by mid-century, flesh-
out the 2050 roadmap with more detailed policies 
across different sectors, and provide clear targets for 
the energy sector. Moreover, the ETS has been beset 
with internal problems since its launch in 2005, and 
even today, due in part to surplus allowances and low 
fuel prices, it has not performed as intended, with 
the carbon price being consistently too low. Previous 
attempts at reform through the back-loading of 
allowances were unsuccessful;[7] thus, the provisions 
introduced by the 2030 framework may be insufficient. 
The EU should adopt additional measures to ensure 
that the price of carbon will increase, as this will act 
as a stimulus to reach emissions targets. For example, 
the ETS needs to accelerate the incorporation of all 
emissions from international aviation, as well as extend 
into sectors such as transport, currently the purview of 
member states. Likewise, it is important to maintain 
a unified carbon price across the EU; this could be 
done through the creation of a Common Authority with 
sufficient powers to maintain the carbon price within 
certain ranges. For sectors not covered by the ETS, the 
introduction of a common EU carbon tax could also help 
to preserve a unified carbon price.[8] Furthermore, 
the 27% target for renewables and energy efficiency 
is non-binding, as member states have refused to 
surrender control over their national energy mix. 
Therefore, countries are merely encouraged to meet 
these targets, and the likely result is that ‘greener’ 
member states will achieve them, while other less 
environmentally committed countries may not. 
 
Member State climate and energy policies
 
This situation of a multi-speed Europe, whereby a 
group of environmentally-minded states takes the lead 
while others lag behind, has been a recurring problem 
for the EU. This goes back to the Single European 
Act in 1986, when climate and energy policies were 
established as ‘shared competences’. This means that 
there is only so much EU institutions can do, as they 
cannot force reluctant member states to enact policies 
against their will. Due to variations in political culture 
and economic traditions, the environmental zeal of 
member states has varied considerably. Countries such 
as Germany, the Netherlands, as well as Scandinavian 
countries, have enacted many of the most ambitious 
environmental legislation in the world, often exceeding 
EU targets. For example, in 2010, the German 
government announced far-reaching GHG emissions 
reduction objectives (from a 1990 baseline), including 
a 40% cut by 2020, 55% by 2030, 70% by 2040, and 
between 85-95% by 2050.[9] Similarly, as the host 
of the COP21, the French government sought to set 
the example with its Energy Transition Law.[10] The 
latter includes cuts of at least 40% in GHG emissions 
by 2030 and 80% by 2050 (from a 1990 baseline), 
and an increase in renewable energies by 23% in 2020 
and 32% in 2030. Likewise, French President Macron 
has adopted a Climate Plan, which includes reaching 
carbon neutrality for the French economy by 2050, as 
well as banning the sale of diesel and gasoline vehicles 
and ending fossil fuel exploitation by 2040.
By contrast, other member states have been described 
as ‘environmental laggards’. The EU has taken 
into consideration the fact that certain countries 
may require more leeway in order to develop their 
economies, providing flexibility mechanisms to allow 
them to meet their climate targets. Nevertheless, this 
flexibility has sometimes been taken too far, and several 
member states have relied on it to avoid more robust 
environmental policy. For example, Poland’s economy 
is among the most carbon and resource intensive in 
the entire OECD, due in part to its continued reliance 
on coal as a source of cheap energy. Over the last 
few years, Poland has been one of the largest GHG 
emitters per capita in the EU; in 2012, it had the 
highest average concentration of health-damaging 
particles in its air in Europe. Similarly, Estonia is the 
7. Vogler J., Chapter 12: “The 
Challenge of the Environment, 
Energy and Climate Change”, 
taken from Hill C., Smith M. 
and Vanhoonacker S. (eds.), 
International Relations and the 
European Union (Third Edition 
2017), Oxford University Press, 
p. 283. 
8. Trannoy A. and Aussilloux 
V., Pour une Europe leader de 
la transition énergétique, Télos, 
2017. 
9. In 2014, the former Grand 
Coalition government approved 
a Climate Action Program to 
support additional measures 
to meet its 2020 objectives; 
likewise, a Climate Action Plan 
was announced in 2016 to 
accelerate the implementation of 
targets for 2030, 2040 and 2050 
and meet German commitments 
under the Paris Agreement. 
10. Due to the high share of 
nuclear power in its energy 
mix (75% in 2016), France has 
always had a relatively low share 
of GHG emissions in relation 
to the size of its economy. 
However, nuclear energy remains 
controversial, particularly since 
the 2011 Fukushima incident 
in Japan. 
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largest GHG emitter per capita in the EU, in addition 
to having the most carbon-intensive economy in the 
OECD. This is linked to its reliance on shale oil mining 
for cheap energy production, which has been used 
to support high domestic demand in winter. Over the 
last few years, Estonia has seen the largest relative 
increase of GHG emissions within the EU, especially in 
sectors such as electricity and heat production.
This problem of a multi-speed Europe due to shared 
competence is difficult to resolve. Member states have 
been reluctant to transfer greater powers to Brussels, 
especially with the rise of Eurosceptic populist 
movements across the region. As a result, because 
climate and energy policy are likely to remain shared 
competences for the near future, the EU needs to learn 
how to better utilize the tools already at its disposal.
[11] Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty contains provisions 
that have the potential to bolster EU green legislation. 
Exclusive EU competences, shared competences and 
member state prerogatives were clarified by the 
Treaty’s ‘catalogue of competences’, which contains a 
well-defined categorization of competence allocation 
in the EU legal order. Moreover, the Treaty placed 
environmental policy as one of the EU’s core aims 
and top priorities.[12] Additionally, the Treaty further 
extended the scope of the co-decision procedure, 
renamed the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, and 
mainstreamed it into almost all fields relating to 
the environment. Nevertheless, coordination of 
shared competences would be enhanced by more 
frequent meetings of member state environmental 
ministers within the EU Environment Council, as 
well as the establishment of more direct channels of 
communication between the Commission and national 
environmental ministries. Finally, those member states 
considered to be ‘environmental laggards’ also receive 
substantial funding from the EU; as an incentive for 
more action, the EU could apply stricter environmental 
criteria to the allocation of such funding in the future. 
 
Energy Security and the internal energy market
 
The issue of shared competence has also hampered 
the EU’s ability to develop an effective approach to 
the subject of energy security.[13] The EU imports 
more than half of the energy it consumes, and many 
member states are heavily reliant on Russia. This has 
made the EU vulnerable to supply disruptions; for 
instance, Moscow interrupted gas supplies through 
Ukraine in 2006, 2009 and again in 2014. In response, 
the EU developed an Energy Security Strategy in 
May 2014, and has sought to construct an integrated 
internal energy market. However, progress on both 
fronts has been slow; shared competence for energy 
policy has led to problems of coordination between 
EU institutions and member states. Likewise, despite 
several consecutive ‘energy packages’, the EU today 
still lacks a properly functioning and fully integrated 
energy market. This has had a direct impact on the EU’s 
ability to meet its climate and energy targets. Indeed, 
both the EU’s Energy Security Strategy and the internal 
energy market contain ambitious policies to increase 
the share of renewable energies and energy efficiency, 
as this contributes to reducing the EU’s dependence on 
energy imports. Therefore, climate and energy security 
policies are in fact complementary.
EU institutions have been slow to recognize this 
connection and, although some progress has been 
made, contradictions remain between climate and 
energy security policies. For instance, the Commission 
has sought to enhance EU energy security by 
diversifying supply sources through the exploitation of 
new hydrocarbon resources released by the melting of 
ice in the Arctic. However, exploiting these new fossil 
fuels only accelerates global warming and the melting 
of Arctic ice, which allows for further exploitation of 
hydrocarbons, thus leading to a self-defeating cycle. In 
order to align its climate and energy security policies, 
the EU could organize a single Directorate-General 
(DG) within the Commission in order to bring both 
fields under one roof; currently, these responsibilities 
are divided among three different DGs with overlapping 
competences.[14] The same could be done within 
the European Parliament, where a single committee 
working on both energy and the environment could 
be created, instead of the two separate committees 
currently in place. Moreover, it is essential to accelerate 
the completion of the internal energy market by 
building missing infrastructure links between member 
states, and perhaps also establishing a unified 
11. Over the long run, in order 
to enact more far-reaching 
environmental legislation 
and lead by example, it may 
eventually become necessary 
to transfer greater powers to 
Brussels for climate and energy 
policy, with the aim of eventual 
exclusive EU competences. 
12. Article 3 TEU provides a 
list of the EU’s objectives: “A 
high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of 
the environment is one of the 
objectives of the Union, which 
shall also contribute to the 
sustainable development of 
the Earth.” 
13. Energy security can be 
defined as “the availability of 
sufficient energy supplies at 
affordable prices”. See: Hill, 
p.275.
14. This includes the DG for 
Climate Action, the DG for 
Energy, as well as the DG for 
the Environment.
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regulator for the whole of the EU energy market. This 
would accelerate the integration of renewable energies 
within the internal energy market and contribute to 
spreading clean technologies across Europe. There is 
great potential to achieve this, given that renewables 
and clean technologies have experienced a dramatic fall 
in costs over the last few years that is set to continue, 
meaning they are now able to compete head-on with 
fossil fuels.[15]  
 
3. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: 
LEADING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
 
Reclaiming centre stage in the global climate 
regime
 
Following recent weather catastrophes, including 
powerful hurricanes that have swept through Texas, 
Florida and the Caribbean which many scientists 
say are directly related to global warming, Trump 
has faced pressure to reverse his decision over the 
Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, although there have 
been contradictory declarations over the accord, his 
administration is unlikely to galvanize any meaningful 
action on climate change, either domestically or 
internationally.[16] Thus, at least until the next 
presidential election in 2020, the US has in all likelihood 
vacated its former leadership role in the climate 
regime. If Europe succeeds in leading by example, then 
it will have the authority to fill the vacuum left by US 
withdrawal. EU leadership for the COP21 was focused 
more on its role as a mediator and an organizer. Europe 
was instrumental in creating the necessary framework 
that allowed for the signing of the Paris Agreement by 
195 countries, building bridges between developed and 
developing countries. Now that the US is once again 
withdrawing, the EU must return to centre stage in 
the climate regime. This is important, as several large 
GHG emitters such as Russia, Saudi Arabia or Iran, 
who reluctantly signed the Paris Agreement, remain 
sceptical about climate policies. As large fossil fuel 
producing nations, they have most to lose from the 
global transition to clean energies. Although these 
countries have indicated that they will remain parties 
to the accord, any sign of disengagement may serve 
as an opportunity for them to renege on their climate 
pledges, which might trigger a domino effect.
In order to reclaim such a leadership role, however, 
Europe must first reform the procedures by which it 
engages in climate negotiations. While the issue of 
shared competence has been problematic for internal 
legislation, it has been even more so for external 
relations. It has resulted in up to three different types 
of actors claiming to represent the EU’s position. 
Depending on their respective competences, this 
includes the Commission, the rotating Presidency of the 
EU Council, as well as individual member states. This 
resulting ‘troika’ has made it problematic for Europe to 
speak with one voice on the world stage. An internal 
negotiation always precedes and is often conducted at 
the same time as international negotiations, which has 
repeatedly bogged down the EU. Since countries have 
been reluctant to transfer greater powers to Brussels 
over foreign policy, the EU and its member states need 
to find new ways of enhancing cohesion within the 
climate regime. One way could be to make better use 
of the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions for external relations, 
including the position of High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs, as well as the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). So far however, the EU has chosen not to 
them sufficiently during climate negotiations, perhaps 
to avoid overshadowing member states.[17] This is 
arguably a mistake. In comparison to the current ‘troika 
system’, the High Representative and the EEAS have 
far greater potential to provide the EU with more unity 
on the world stage. Speaking with a single voice is of 
critical importance if Europe is to succeed in reclaiming 
centre stage in the climate regime.  
 
Building a solid web of international climate 
partnerships
 
However, the international situation is now very 
different from the last time Europe exercised such a 
leadership role. During the 1990s and 2000s, the EU 
was still the second largest GHG emitter after the US, 
and China was a relatively poorer country. Today, the 
EU is ranked third, as China has surpassed both Europe 
and the US as the first global emitter, and is also on 
track to eventually become the world’s largest economy. 
More significantly, the EU’s share of global emissions is 
15. For example, the cost of 
batteries in electric vehicles 
has decreased by 80% since 
2008, and that of offshore wind 
energy has decreased by more 
than 50% over the past three 
years in Northern Europe. 2016 
was also the first year when 
renewable energies surpassed 
coal as the world’s largest source 
of power-generating capacity. 
See: The Economist, The Burning 
Question: With or without 
America, self-interest will sustain 
the fight against global warming, 
November 26th – December 
2nd 2016. 
16. For instance, US Secretary 
of State Rex Tillerson explained 
during an interview in September 
that Trump could change his 
mind over the Paris Agreement 
“if we can construct a set of 
terms that we believe is fair". 
Nonetheless, the US Republican 
Party as a whole remains very 
skeptical about climate change, 
in part due to the pressure 
exercised by powerful lobbying 
groups. Indeed, the Trump 
administration has embarked 
on a policy to dismantle the US 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
17. Although the EU’s Foreign 
Affairs Council adopted a Climate 
Diplomacy Action Plan in 2015, 
this remains an isolated and 
insufficient attempt to make 
better use of the Lisbon Treaty’s 
new foreign policy provisions in 
climate diplomacy.
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gradually decreasing, due partly to the success of its 
environmental legislation, but above all because of the 
economic take off of developing countries, particularly 
the BRIC nations. Logically, this would indicate that the 
EU’s influence within the climate regime is set to decline 
and it will not be able to exercise a leadership role on its 
own. As a result, it is essential for the EU to establish a 
strong collaboration with China in international climate 
negotiations; this partnership should serve as the new 
backbone of the Paris Agreement. If they succeed in 
working together as the first and third largest global 
GHG emitters, the EU and China should be able to 
counter-act disengagement from the US (the 2nd global 
emitter). Chinese President Xi Jinping has reaffirmed 
his determination to implement China’s commitments 
under the Paris Agreement and safeguard the climate 
regime. China has strong incentives to transition 
towards a greener future, as the country is facing a 
severe ecological crisis due to uncontrolled economic 
development.[18] Moreover, Beijing sees Trump’s 
semi-isolationism as an opportunity for China to step 
into a leadership position and heighten its influence 
on the world stage, legitimizing its concept of ‘regime 
neutrality’.[19]
Therefore, there is great potential for enhancing the 
partnership between the EU and China within the 
climate regime. Indeed, they worked closely together 
during the latest COPs, and even issued a joint 
declaration to support the Paris Agreement following 
Trump’s announcement of withdrawal. Since the EU 
is China’s first trading partner and China is Europe’s 
second trading partner, they have already established 
a close working relationship on many issues. Since 
2003, China and the EU have been involved in a 
Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which involves 
annual Summits that cover a wide range of topics from 
trade to security. This has provided the basis for the 
development of a variety of frameworks for cooperation 
specifically on ‘green issues’, including the Climate 
Change Partnership since 2005, the Environment Policy 
Dialogue held at Ministerial level, as well as the EU-
China Energy Cooperation Roadmap signed in 2016. 
While impressive, these different platforms have 
focused more on dialogue and information sharing, 
rather than concrete policy issues. Thus, it is important 
to reform the mechanisms for EU-China cooperation so 
that they deliver tangible policy results that are related 
to the COP process. Nevertheless, while it is essential 
for the EU and China to enhance their partnership to 
safeguard the Paris Agreement, Europe cannot ignore 
Beijing’s poor human rights record. This would be in 
contradiction with core European democratic values. As a 
result, the key for the EU is to strike a delicate balance by 
reinforcing cooperation with China, while not hesitating 
to criticize the Chinese Communist Party’s human rights 
abuses and authoritarian governance, when appropriate.
Because climate change is a genuinely global issue, dual 
EU-Chinese leadership, while essential, will not be sufficient 
on its own. All nations need to participate, otherwise there 
is the danger of freeriding, whereby one country or group 
of countries benefit from the efforts of all the others while 
not making adequate efforts themselves. The EU should 
rely on its experience as a successful mediator in building 
bridges between developed and developing nations to 
construct a solid web of international climate partnerships 
to ensure a genuinely global level of commitment to 
the Paris Agreement. Firstly, most developed countries 
continue to provide extensive and legally binding sets of 
commitments, thus they still have a key role to play in 
the climate regime. As a result, building strong climate 
partnerships with prosperous countries such as Canada 
and Japan remains very important. The EU has recently 
signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Canada in 
October 2016, known as the ‘Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement’ (CETA); likewise, the EU has also 
recently concluded negotiations for another FTA with 
Japan in July 2017. These FTAs contain several clauses 
on trade and investment in environmental goods and 
services, including tariff liberalization for energy efficient 
and renewable energy products, which can form the 
basis for more sustained cooperation on climate policy. 
Nonetheless, several analysts have criticized these 
environmental clauses for lacking meaningful enforcement 
mechanisms, and point out that they risk being bypassed 
due to the creation of a parallel, privatized justice system 
known as the Investment Court System. Such issues 
will need to be more fully addressed as these FTAs are 
implemented in the years to come.[20] 
 
Ensuring global commitment and a strong legal 
18. For example, about 1.6 
million Chinese people die each 
year due to environmental 
pollution. See: Rohde R. 
A. and Muller R. A., Air 
Pollution in China: Mapping of 
Concentrations and Sources, 
Berkeley Earth, 2015.
19. This involves disconnecting 
good behavior on the 
international stage from 
domestic politics, thereby 
legitimizing authoritarianism 
and discrediting the notion 
that a liberal foreign policy 
necessarily emanates from 
a democratic regime. See: 
Nathan A. J., The Authoritarian 
"Big Five", China's Challenge, 
taken from “Authoritarianism 
Goes Global, The Challenge 
to Democracy”, edited by 
Diamond L., Plattner M. F. and 
Walker C., The John Hopkins 
University Press, 2016, pp. 
23-39. 
20. The Investment Court 
System has been accused of 
undermining regular courts and 
prioritizing corporate interests 
over the environmental 
and social clauses of the 
treaty. See: CETA and the 
environment: a gold standard 
for the planet or for big 
business?, A study by Transport 
& Environment and Client 
Earth, 2016.
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framework for the climate regime
 
Perhaps the greatest change in the climate regime 
over the last decade has been the rise to prominence 
of developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol imposed 
binding targets only on developed countries, with 
developing countries being protected under the principle 
of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.[21] 
However, due to rapid economic growth, developing 
countries have now become major GHG emitters, thus 
they must also be integrated into the climate regime. 
The EU has been instrumental in finding compromise 
solutions considered as fair by developing countries 
to convince them to ratify the Paris Agreement. This 
is partly because the EU has been the world’s largest 
donor of aid for several decades, allowing it to build 
a strong network of partnerships with developing 
countries, mostly in the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
regions (ACP). Moreover, the EU has also been the 
global leader regarding climate finance for many years, 
providing extensive monetary and technical assistance, 
including technology transfers, to help developing 
countries mitigate their emissions and adapt to global 
warming (poor countries are the most vulnerable 
to its effects). The EU participates in a multitude of 
international frameworks for climate finance such as 
the Green Climate Fund, and often relies on financial 
and technical assistance as an incentive to convince 
developing countries to sign onto climate pledges. 
Indeed, the EU’s role as the global leader in climate 
finance will become especially important following US 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.[22] 
The same applies to the emerging BRIC nations. 
India, for example, has enjoyed several decades of 
strong growth and is now the world’s fourth largest 
GHG emitter (after China, the US and the EU). 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi confirmed his 
unwavering support for the Paris Agreement following 
Trump’s announcement of withdrawal. India, which 
has a long tradition of environmental activism, 
seeks to play a leading role in the climate regime to 
enhance its influence on the world stage. Following the 
establishment of a strategic partnership in 2004, the 
EU has reinforced its ties with India through annual 
Summits that cover a broad range of topics, including 
environmental issues. This comprises the Initiative 
on Clean Development and Climate Change, the EU-
India Environment Forum, as well as the Clean Energy 
and Climate Partnership agreed to during the 2016 
Summit. Unlike the Environment Policy Dialogue with 
China, however, there is no institutionalized framework 
for bilateral EU-Indian cooperation at the Ministerial 
level on climate and environmental issues. Thus, the 
EU and India should establish formal regular meetings 
between the EU Commissioner for Climate Action and 
his Indian counterpart to consolidate their partnership 
within the climate regime. Cooperation between India 
and Europe is arguably made easier by the fact that 
they share common democratic values. Thus, as 
India’s economy continues to grow, the EU-Indian 
climate partnership will likely become key to the future 
evolution of the global climate regime.
Europe should also seek to find ways to reinforce the 
legal architecture of the climate regime. While ensuring 
a global level of commitment from both developed and 
developing countries is essential, the Paris Agreement, 
like many environmental accords, is not legally binding. 
It represents a “procedurally, rather than substantively 
binding agreement”.[23] This is unsurprising, as the 
climate regime has always suffered from weak legal 
enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, French President 
Macron’s initiative in the summer 2017 to propose a 
new Global Pact for the Environment is a step in the 
right direction. The purpose of the Pact is to provide 
“a global legal text bringing together fundamental 
principles of environmental law”, which aims to become 
the “cornerstone of international environmental law”.
[24] The Global Pact would become a legally binding 
treaty that could be invoked within national jurisdictions 
to hold states to account on environmental issues. 
The EU needs to ensure that member states ratify 
this Pact rapidly to enhance its credentials as a global 
environmental leader. Moreover, Europe should rely on 
its extensive network of climate partnerships with both 
developed and developing countries to build a broad 
level of international support for the Global Pact. This 
will help to ensure its ratification when submitted to 
the UN General Assembly. 
 
***
21. This refers to the fact that 
developed countries have the 
responsibility to take the lead in 
reducing their GHG emissions, 
given that developing countries 
may require more leeway 
to allow them to grow their 
economies. GHGs have a lifespan 
of up to 100 years, so there 
is also the issue of historical 
contributions to climate change. 
22. The Paris Agreement had 
planned for up to $100 billion of 
financial assistance annually from 
2020 onwards to help developing 
countries, with the US having 
pledged to provide the largest 
contribution. 
23. See: Hill, p. 285. 
24. “It would complete the 
legal edifice of fundamental 
standards: after two international 
Pacts in 1966 – the first one on 
civil and political rights and the 
second one on economic, social 
and cultural rights – this new 
Pact would consecrate a third 
generation of fundamental rights, 
dedicated to the environment 
and development”. See: Le Club 
des Juristes, Toward a Global 
Pact for the Environment: Action 
for the planet, action through 
law, 24 June 2017.
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How Europe can and should become
the guardian of the Paris Agreement on climate change?
 Europe can and should become the guardian of the 
Paris Agreement on climate change. Following US 
disengagement, there is a leadership vacuum that 
needs to be filled. The EU and its member states have 
the potential to lead by example, as they are in the 
process of enacting some of the most far-reaching 
environmental legislation in the world. However, 
problems of coordination between member states and 
EU institutions under shared competence, as well as 
institutional competition and occasional contradictions 
between climate and energy security policies, will need 
to be addressed. The EU has begun to position itself 
at the heart of the global climate regime through an 
extended web of partnerships with both developed and 
developing countries around the world. Nonetheless, 
Europe will need to enhance cohesion in climate 
negotiations by speaking with a single voice on the 
world stage, as well as work on reinforcing the legal 
architecture of the climate regime. There is great 
potential for the EU to strengthen both its internal and 
external climate actions, as opinion surveys indicate 
consistently high levels of popular support on this issue 
across the EU.[25]
Overall, Europe needs the climate regime as much as 
the climate regime needs Europe. Indeed, the EU is 
currently suffering from internal divisions with the rise 
of populist Eurosceptic movements. Climate change 
represents a salient issue with the potential to enhance 
European unity, since most member states agree that 
action should be taken. Moreover, if the EU succeeds 
in enacting ambitious environmental legislation, 
this will attract green investments and international 
entrepreneurs, helping to consolidate the economic 
recovery. Likewise, climate diplomacy has also 
provided EU external relations with a palpable success. 
Regardless of weaknesses in other areas, climate 
negotiations represent an opportunity for the EU to 
bolster its presence on the global stage. Conversely, 
the climate regime needs the EU because otherwise, 
following US disengagement, China risks filling in the 
vacuum on its own and becoming the main power. If an 
authoritarian government comes to dominate the global 
climate regime, this might impact its legitimacy in the 
long run. Thus, EU leadership is necessary to balance 
China’s power and infuse democratic values into the 
climate regime. This is especially true since the EU, due 
to its very nature, is ideally positioned to contribute. 
Climate negotiations do not require any sort of hard 
military power, but rather subtle diplomatic skills and 
‘soft power’. As an archetypical normative power, the 
EU can successfully rely on tools such as multilateral 
diplomacy to shape the international climate agenda 
and become the guardian of the Paris Agreement.
Arnault Barichella
A Graduate of Sciences Po & Oxford (St. Peter's 
College).
25. According to a 
Eurobarometer survey, 91% 
of EU citizens see climate 
change as a serious problem, 
69% as a "very serious" and 
22% as a "fairly serious" 
problem. Likewise, most people 
(93%) agree that addressing 
climate change will only be 
effective if all countries of 
the world act together. See: 
Special Eurobarometer Report 
on Climate Change (n°435), 
Survey conducted by TNS 
political & social at the request 
of the European Commission, 
D.G. for Climate Action, June 
2015.
